Mildred Rhoades v. James C. Wright aka James Clifford Wright and Clifford Wright, and Essie Wright  : Brief of Petitioner by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
Mildred Rhoades v. James C. Wright aka James
Clifford Wright and Clifford Wright, and Essie
Wright : Brief of Petitioner
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
P. Keith Nelson; Brandt, Miller, Nelson & Christopherson; Attorneys for Respondents.
Arthur H. Nielsen; Randall L. Romrell; Nielsen, Conder, Henriod & Gottfredson; Duane A.
Frandsen; Frandsen & Keller; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation







u i a n iUKKtME COURT* 
BRIEF 
imi fftt THE STATE OF UTAH 
LAW LIBRARY 
SEP i 7 1975 
i-
MILDRED RHOADES individually and as 
Administratrix of the Estate of Claude 
Riio ace s , &<?. c e as ed, 3 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
JAMES C. WRIGHT, also known as JAMES 
CLIFFORD WRIGHT, and CLIFFORD BRIGHT 
and ESSIE WRIGHT, his wife, ^ ^ 
Defendants - Respondents. 
BRIGHAM YQUM HHiVERSlTY 





Appeal from the Seventh Judicial District 
Court of San Juan County, Utah, Honorable 
Edward She/a, Judge 
Arthur R. Nielsen 
Randall L. Romrell 
NIELSEN, CONDER, HENRIOD | 
GOTTFREDSON 
410 N'ewhouse Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4111 
Duane A. I; rands en 
FRAWSSEN AND KELLER 
Pro f e s sio nai Building 
Price, Utah 84S01 
Attorneys for ?ls.intiff-
Appellant 
P. KEITH NELSON 
BRANDT, MILLER, NELSON § 
CHRI STOPHEP.SC'Ni 
716 Newhouse Office Building 




JUL 2 7 
X Clerk, Suprc 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MILDRED RHOADES individually and as 




JAMES C. WRIGHT, also known as JAMES 
CLIFFORD WRIGHT, and CLIFFORD WRIGHT 






Appeal from the Seventh Judicial District 
Court of San Juan County, Utah, Honorable 
Edward Sheya, Judge 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Randall L. Romrell 
NIELSEN, CONDER, HENRIOD § 
GOTTFREDSON 
410 Newhouse Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Duane A. Frandsen 
FRANDSEN AND KELLER 
Professional Building 
Price, Utah 84501 
P. KEITH NELSON 
BRANDT, MILLER, NELSON § 
CHRISTOPHERSON 
716 Newhouse Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 




Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
AND IN THE SUPREME COURT 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY PETITION FOR REHEARING. . . 2 




THIS COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
PRIOR DECISION IN THE FEDERAL CASE IS 
NOT RES JUDICATA 4 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE 
ORIGINAL WRIT OF ATTACHMENT BE 
REINSTATED 7 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT RESTRICTING 
THE ATTACHMENT TO THE PRESENT TITLE 
OWNERS OF THE PROPERTY 9 
CONCLUSION 10 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 




Belliston v. Texaco, Inc. 
521 P. 2d 379 (Utah 1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
Burns v. Kepler 
147 Colo. 153, 362 P.2d 1037 (1961). . . . . . . . 6 
Clement v. Four North State Street Corp. 
360 F. Supp. 933 (D. N.H. 1973). . . . . 9 
Day State Harness Horse Racing and Breeding 
Ass'n., Inc., v. PPG Industries, Inc7 
365 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Mass. 1973) 9 
Fuentes v. Shevin 
407 U.S. 67 (1972) 7 
Gunter v. Merchants Warren NatTl Bank 
360 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Me. 1973). . 9 
Manning v. Palmer 
381 F. Supp. 713 (D. Ariz. 1974) 9 
McClellan v. Commercial Credit Corp. 
350 F. Supp. 1013 (D. R.I. 1972) . . 9 
In re Northwest Homes 
363 F. Supp. 725 (D. Wash. 1973) 9 
Ownbey v. Morgan 
256 U.S.- 94 (1921) , 7 
Partmar Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Theater Corp. 
3*47 U.S. 89 (1954) at pp. 90-91 6 
Pennoyer v. Neff 
95 U.S. 714 (1877) 7 
People v. Wright 
511 P. 2d 460 (Colo. 1973) 2 
Richards v. Hodson 
26 U.2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044, (1971) . . . . . . . . 6 
ii Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Roscoe v, Buller 
367 F. Supp. 575 (D. My. 1973) 9 
Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co. 
383 F. Supp. 643 (D. N.Y. 1974) 9 
Wheaton v. Pearson 
14 U.2d 45, 376 P.2d 946 (1962) 7 
RULES AND STATUTES 
Rule 64 C (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. . . . 4 
Rule 76 (e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure . . . . 4 
SECONDARY AUTHORITIES 
46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments, Sec. 417 (1969) . . . . 6 
iii Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
•00000O00000--
MILDRED RHOADES, individually 
and as Administratrix of the 
Estate of Claude Rhoades, 
deceased, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs-
JAMES C. WRIGHT, also known 
as JAMES CLIFFORD WRIGHT, and * 
CLIFFORD WRIGHT and 
ESSIE WRIGHT, his wife, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 




NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover for the wrongful death of 
Claude Rhoades. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT * 
AND IN THE SUPREME COURT 
Judge Edward Sheya dismissed plaintiff's complaint and 
quashed service of process holding that attachment is an im-
proper method of conferring jurisdiction ir\ a wrongful death case 
and vacated the plaintiff's writ of attachment. The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah reversed this decision and remanded the case 
for reinstatement of the writ of attachment. 
(1) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT BY PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Defendants seek to have the decision of the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed and affirm the decision of the lower Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This is a wrongful death action which arose in Colorado 
on April 19, 1970. Clifford and Essie Wright are the parents of 
James C. Wright and all are residents of Delores County, Colorado, 
which adjoins San Juan County, Utah. At all times material to 
this action, all defendants were residents of Colorado and the 
activities which gave rise to this cause of action occurred in 
Colorado. Similarly, during this time period, plaintiff Mildred 
Rhoades, wife of Claude Rhoades, deceased, resided with her hus-
band on a ranch just inside the Utah border in San Juan County, 
Utah. 
On April 19, 1970, Claude and Mildred Rhoades stopped 
the defendants on a roadway near the Wright home in Colorado 
ostensibly to discuss the conditions of windblown farm land. 
An argument ensued between Claude Rhoades and James C. Wright 
during which Mr. Wright shot and killed Rhoades after Rhoades 
made threatening remarks and movements indicating he was pro-
ducing a gun. James C. Wright was prosecuted for first degree 
murder and found guilty. That conviction was reversed by the 
Colorado Supreme Court, a copy of that decision, People v. 
Wright, 511 P. 2d 460 (Colo. 1973), is attached. At a sub-
sequent hearing Mr. Wright was found not guilty. 
(2) 
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thereafter perfected this appeal in the Utah Supreme Court, The 
parties then filed briefs, argued the case orally to the Court, 
and on July 8, 1976 the Supreme Court filed its decision reversing 
the lower Court and reinstating the writ of attachment. Defendants 
now petition this Court for rehearing pursuant to Rule 76 (e), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ISSUES 
1. This Court erred in holding that the prior deci-
sion in the federal case is not res judicata. 
2. This Court erred in ordering the original writ 
of attachment be reinstated. 
3. This Court erred in not restricting the attach-
ment to the present title owners of the property. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIOR 
DECISION IN THE FEDERAL CASE IS NOT RES 
JUDICATA. 
The action in the Federal District Court, the action 
in Colorado and the action in San Juan County all involve identical 
issues of fact and involve the same parties. In the federal ac-
tion, plaintiff sought to obtain in rem jurisdiction by attaching 
defentdantsf property pursuant to 64 C (a) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure which read as follows: 
The plaintiff, at any time after the filing 
of a complaint . . . in an action to recover 
(4) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Petitioners assert that this holding is inconsistent 
with prior cases from the United States Supreme Court and prior 
decisions from the Utah Supreme Court and hence constitutes 
error. The rule is firmly established in this jurisdiction 
and in others that res judicata applies to all issues which 
were raised in a prior proceeding and which could have been 
raised in that proceeding. This rule is firmly established 
in the case of Partmar Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Theater 
Corp., 347 U.S. 89 (1954) at pp. 90-91: 
We have often held that under the doc-
trine of res judicata a judgment entered in 
an action conclusively settles that action 
as to all matters that were or might have 
been litigated or adjudged therein. 
See also 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments, Sec. 417 (1969); Burns 
v. Kepler, 147 Colo. 153, 362 P.2d 1037 (1961). 
The Utah Spureme Court has taken the same position. 
In Richards v. Hodson, 26 U.2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044, (1971), 
the Court stated: 
Strictly speaking, the term nres judicata" 
applies to a judgment between the same parties 
who in a prior action litigated the identical 
questions which are present in the latter case. 
Not only are the parties bound by the ruling on 
matters actually litigated, but are also pre-
vented from raising issues which should have 
r
 been raised in the former action. The rule of 
law is wise in that it gives finality to judg-
ments and also conserves the time of courts, in 
that courts should not be required to relitigate 
matters which have once been fully and finally 
litigated 
(6) 
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public interest, (2) where there has been a special need for 
very prompt action and (3) where the state has kept strict con-
trol over its monopoly of legitimate force. But in no case was 
a post-seizure hearing waived: In all instances the defendant 
must be afforded an opportunity short of trial to challenge the 
propriety of the attachment* 
The Court in the instant case stated as follows with 
respect to the Utah attachment rule as it existed at the time 
defendant's property was seized: 
It [the attachment statute] also provides for 
a hearing, at the instance of the defendant, 
r at any time, upon such notice to the plaintiff 
as the Court may require. At which hearing 
the Court passes on the justification for the 
writ. In this, of course, would be prior to 
the deprivation of any significant property 
interest. 
The Utah attachment statute prior to its modification 
in March, 1976, contained no provision for a hearing at the in-
stance of the defendant or anyone other than to challenge the 
sureties. Neither a pre nor a post-seizure hearing was provided 
and in this respect the attachment statute is unquestionably 
unconstitutional. To remand this case now to the lower Court for 
further proceedings under the attachment writ as reinstated 
allows plaintiff to proceed under a procedure that is without 
constitutional justification. Such a procedure is error and is 
contrary to the procedural guidelines laid down in virtually 
every decision in the country either on the federal or state 
(8) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
level interpreting notice requirements under various attach-
ment statutes. The following cases support this proposition: 
Manning v. Palmer, 381 F. Supp. 713 (D. Ariz. 1974); Sugar v. 
Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643 (D. N.Y. 1974); Roscoe 
v. Buller, 367 F. Supp. 575 (D. My. 1973); Day State Harness 
Horse Racing and Breeding Ass'n., Inc., v. PPG Industries, Inc., 
365 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Mass. 1973); In re Northwest Homes, 363 F. 
Supp. 725 (D. Wash. 1973); Gunter v. Merchants Warren Nat'l Bank, 
360 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Me. 1973); Clement v. Four North State 
Street Corp. , 360 F. Supp. 933 (D. N.H. 1973); McClellan v. Com-
mercial Credit Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1013 (D. R.I. 1972). 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT RESTRICTING THE ATTACH-
MENT TO THE PRESENT TITLE OWNERS OF THE PROPERTY. 
As noted in the Statement of Facts, the present title 
owners of the property in Utah are Mr. and Mrs. Clifford Wright. 
James C. Wright is not a title owner and conveyed his interest 
to his parents in 1970. Plaintiffs alleged this conveyance was 
without consideration and made with the intent to defraud 
creditors, namely plaintiff. As the record now stands, however, 
Mr. and Mrs. Clifford Wright are the sole title owners and the 
attachment can extend only to the interests they hold. James C. 
Wright has no interest in the property and is not a proper party 
in this proceeding. Justice Crockett notes in his concurring 
opinion that this case has dual aspects in view of the alleged 
(9) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fraudulent conveyance. Defendants submit no evidence has been 
introduced in the record that the conveyance was fraudulent and 
that the mere allegation of fraud is insufficient in law to 
justify the reinstatement of the writ. The point of greater 
significance however is that James C. Wright remains a party 
defendant when he has no ownership interests in the property; 
this constitutes error. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendants invite the Court to review its decision 
previously filed in this matter. Defendants strongly believe 
the Court erred in the particulars raised in this petition and 
that the decision as it now stands is contrary to prior deci-
sions of this jurisdiction with respect to res judicata, is 
contrary to decisions of the United States Supreme Court and 
the weight of authority in other jurisdictions with respect 
to notice requirements under the attachment statute, and, fi-
nally, contrary to the legal principle that attachment extends 
only to title owners of the property. James C. Wright should 
therefore be dismissed as a party defendant. 
DATED this day of July, 1976. 
BRANDT, MILLER, NELSON § 
CHRISTOPHERSON 
P. KEITH NELSON 
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents 
716 Newhouse Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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460 Colo. 511 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
James Clifford WRIGHT, Defendant-
Appellant. 
No. 25082. 
Supreme Court of Colorado, 
En Banc. 
June 18, 1973. 
Defendant was convicted in the Dis-
trict Court, Dolores County, Willard W. 
Rusk, Jr., J., of first-degree murder, and 
he appealed The Supreme Court, Day, J.y 
held that district attorney's allusions at 
trial to fact that defendant had not 
presented his theory of self-defense during 
investigation and questioning were consti-
tutionally impermissible inferences that de-
fendant was guilty and that an honest an-
swer would have incriminated him and 
such statements were violative of defend-
ant's right to remain silent 
Judgment reversed and cause remand-
ed with directions. 
Pringle, C. J., and Erickson, J., did not 
participate. 
1. Criminal Law <£=>393(1) 
Not only does a defendant have right 
to remain silent, but it is improper for 
prosecution to allude to his exercise of that 
right as indicating a consciousness of guilt. 
Const, art. 2, § 18; U.S.GA.Const. 
Amends. 5,14. 
2. Criminal Law <S»393(I) 
It is impermissible to penalize individ-
ual for exercising his Fifth Amendment 
privilege when he is under police custodial 
interrogation. Const art. 2, § 18; U.S.C 
A.Const Amends. 5, 14. 
3. Criminal Law <S=407(I) 
Prosecution may not use at trial fact 
that defendant stood mute or claimed his 
privilege in face of accusation. 
4. Criminal Law C=>393(!) 
District attorney's allusions at trial to 
fact that defendant had not presented his 
theory of self-defense during investigation 
and questioning were constitutionally im-
permissible inferences that defendant was-
guilty and that an honest answer would 
have incriminated him and such statements 
were violative of defendant's right to re-
main silent Const art. 2, § 18; U.S.C.A. 
Const Amends. 5, 14. 
5. Criminal Law 0719(3) 
District attorney's comments in closing* 
argument upon his own honesty and integ-
rity as an elected public official and on ve-
racity and honesty of sheriff were improp-
er. 
6. Criminal Law <S=»719(3) 
It is improper for a prosecutor to ex-
press his personal belief or opinion as to 
truth or falsity of any testimony or evi-
dence or guilt of the defendant 
7. Criminal Law <3»438(4) 
Where photographs depicting a recon-
struction of position of decedent's truck 
and defendant's automobile at scene of kill-
ing were only offered to lend support to 
defendant's testimonial contentions, exclu-
sion of the stage photgraphs was not error* -
8. Criminal Law <3=»437 
Where an exhibit has been arranged 
simply to portray a scene and thereby sup-
ports testimonial contentions, and when 
other witnesses dispute accuracy or cor-
rectness of the reconstructed scene, trial 
court should not admit the evidence, but if 
parties agree the exhibit correctly portrays 
the scene, the reconstruction may be admit-
ted. 
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., John P. 
Moore, Deputy Atty. Gen., David A. So-
renson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plain-
tiff-appellee. 
Walter L. Gerash, H. D. Reed, Denver, 
for defendant-appellant 
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efendant-appellant, James C. Wright, 
convicted by a jury of first-degree 
der and sentenced to life imprisonment 
will be referred to as defendant or 
ght 
n April 19, 1970, defendant and his 
sits, Clifford and Essie Wright, had 
ted relatives in Dove Creek. On their 
- home, they observed the decedent, 
tide Rhoades, and his wife coming from 
opposite direction in their pickup truck. 
>re was some difficulty encountered as 
cars passed on a narrow and somewhat 
idy road. Rhoades turned his truck 
and and caught up with and overtook 
Wright vehicle. Wright claimed that 
was run off the road, and that Rhoades 
led in front of his car and stopped the 
ck. Rhoades then started back towards 
•ight's car. Wright remained behind the 
eel of his car, but as Rhoades ap-
>ached, Wright removed a pistol from a 
:ket in the car and laid it on the seat 
ct to him. According to Wright, 
oades opened the encounter between the 
a by making accusations about Wright's 
ddiing in Rhoades' affairs. Rhoades 
:n allegedly made a movement with his 
;ht hand toward his right rear pocket 
that instant defendant raised his pistol 
d pulled the trigger. The shot killed 
toades instantly. 
Decedent's wife, who had been standing 
few feet away, moved the truck to allow 
t Wright car to get by. Wright drove to 
s home and immediately notified the ap-
opriate authorities of the death. He also 
lied his own attorney, who arrived about 
c same time as the sheriff and district 
torney. Thus, during the investigation, 
Pendant's attorney was present Defend-
*t and his parents—on advice of counsel 
•refused to answer questions, but were 
scribed as being cooperative in other 
a3's with the sheriff and district attorney. 
Defendant at the trial contended he act-
* in necessary self-defense. There was 
cveloped in the evidence a picture, first, 
1
 a reasonably friendly and neighborly re-
WRIGHT Colo. 4 6 1 
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lationship between Wright and Rhoades, 
who was married to Wright's cousin, but 
subsequently a deteriorating relationship 
between the two. The hostility began in 
1965 when Rhoades and Wright's cousin 
were divorced. It continued to 1970—the 
time of the homicide. It was fed by such 
incidents as defendant's mother's lending 
money to Rhoades' wife during the divorce 
proceeding plus contentions that defendant 
allegedly supplied information to his cous-
in—who had moved to California—as to 
Rhoades' farming operations so that her 
share of the profits might not suffer. 
Wright claimed that because of the fric-
tion of the divorce the decedent had made 
direct threats to him and had engaged in 
violent actions towards third persons relat-
ed to the defendant Wright also claimed 
he felt apprehensive and threatened be-
cause of decedent's numerous suspicious 
activities near Wright's residence. There 
was substantial other evidence of dece-
dent's violent propensities and his continu-
ing hostility toward the Wrights. This 
background, Wright claimed, prompted him 
to place the gun by his side when Rhoades 
approached him. His fears allegedly sur-
faced when Rhoades made the claimed 
movement towards his hip pocket On the 
other hand, there was testimony from dece-
dent's wife that the defendant waited for 
Rhoades to come back from his truck to 
the Wright car and then shot Rhoades 
without provocation. 
Throughout the trial, in eliciting direct 
testimony from the sheriff and in question-
ing defendant's father and mother, as well 
as in cross-examination of defendant, the 
district attorney continuously, over objec-
tion, alluded to the fact that Wright had 
not presented his theory of self-defense 
during the investigation and questioning by 
the sheriff and district attorney. At nu-
merous times during the trial, the district 
attorney made direct reference and side-
bar arguments concerning defendant's re-
maining silent and his refusal to answer 
questions. It was brought out four times 
on direct examination of the sheriff. In 
\ 
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cross-examination of Wright, the district 
attorney said: 
"Did you entertain a reason not to dis-
cuss this matter with the authorities that 
evening?" (Objection sustained) 
"But in any event you elected to get 
your attorney out there as fast as possi-
ble; wouldn't that be a. true state-
ment?" 
"You didn't relate that to us did you? 
That's what you wanted. You didn't say 
anything; you listened to your attorney 
and you kept your mouth shut; isn't that 
right?" 
During closing argument, among numer-
ous improper comments, the district attor-
ney compounded the prejudice created by 
his questioning of the witnesses with the 
following remarks in his summation : 
"Now, Ladies and Gentlemen, who's 
kidding who ? You know this fella, 
James Wright. You know all about him. 
I don't know what was on Claude 
Rhoades' mind when he told him to mind 
his own business. 
"I submit that this man comes in here 
and tells twelve men and women of this 
county that I shot in self-defense and 
makes them believe it, then he's going to 
beat you to the bank laughing about i t 
"The thing that puzzles me, Ladies 
and Gentlemen, if he meant this self-de-
fense, what was the big secret about tell-
ing Mr. Johnson and myself and Melvin 
Foley that night; this noble act of self-
defense that Mr. Dilts is talking about, 
trying to make you buy. Johnson is a 
reasonable man. I try to be. No, he 
called his attorney. Not only wouldn't 
he talk, but Clifford and Essie wouldn't 
talk because they were afraid they 
would incriminate themselves." 
[1] The primary argument asserted by 
the defendant is based on his constitutional 
right against self-incrimination. U.S. 
Const. Amends. V and XIV; Colo.Const. 
art. II, § 18. Not only does defendant 
have the right to remain silent, but it is 
improper for the prosecution to allude to 
his exercise of that right as indicating a 
consciousness of guilt. 
[2,3] We repeat once again the rule 
stated by the United States Supreme Court 
in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. 
Ct. 1602, 16LEd.2d694: 
u
 * * * In accord with our decision 
today, it is impermissible to penalize an 
individual for exercising his Fifth 
Amendment privilege when he is under 
police custodial interrogation. The pros-
ecution may not, therefore, use at trial 
the fact that he stood mute or claimed 
his privilege in the face of accusation. 
* * *» 
See People v. Mingo, Colo., 509 P.2d 800 
(announced 5/14/73). See also Meader v. 
People, Colo., 497 P2d 1010; Hines v. Peo-
ple, Colo., 497 P.2d 1258; Montoya v. Peo-
ple, 169 Colo. 428, 457 P2d 397; Martinez 
v. People, 162 Colo. 195, 425 P2d 299; 
American Bar Association Standards of 
Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecu-
tion Function, § 5.8. 
[4] We cannot condone the prosecutor-
ial activities utilized by the district attor-
ney in this case on any theory, including 
those based in "traditional methods of 
cross examination." The only inference to 
be drawn from such comments and argu-
ments was that the defendant was guilty 
and that an honest answer would have in-
criminated him. The prejudice that results 
from such activities is of constitutional 
proportion. 
II. 
[5] Compounding the district attorney's 
improper comments on defendant's silence 
were his comments on his own honesty and 
integrity as an elected public official and 
on the veracity and honesty of the sheriff. 
In the closing argument are to be found 
such statements by the prosecutor as : 
"I don't have any doubts about it La-
dies and Gentlemen: you know your 
Sheriff, Bob Johnson, your duly elected 
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El-
K Sheriff, and the rest of those men who 
were called upon to perform a job. 
They had no reason to lie about i t 
don Laffel didn't He about i t * 
I want you to believe me. I want you to 
. !< the judge of my credibility. I'm an 
honest man. * * * Now I'll vouch 
for their veracity and I know that they 
told you people the truth * * *." 
[6] As set out in the American Bar 
Association Standards of Criminal Justice 
Relating to the Prosecution Function § 5.8: 
"(b) It is unprofessional conduct for 
the prosecutor to express his personal 
belief or opinion as to the truth or falsi-
ty of any testimony or evidence or the 
guilt of the defendant" 
We again caution district attorneys 
against overzealousness in their efforts to 
convict and who by improper comments 
impair the conduct of a fair trial. As we 
aid in People v. Walker, Colo., 504 P2d 
109S, concerning the role of the district at-
torney: 
* * * * * A prosecutor's duty is to 
seek justice, not merely to convict 
American Bar Association Standards for 
Criminal Justice Relating to The Prose-
cution Function and The Defense Func-
tion, The Prosecution Function § 1.1. 
*f\V]hile he may strike hard blows, he is 
not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is 
as much his duty to refrain from im-
proper methods calculated to produce a 
•-*• wrongful conviction as it is to use every 
legitimate means to bring about a just 
«*. ' Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 
?8> 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935)/' 
III. 
I'.8] To avoid uncertainty in the event 
** a retrial, we comment on the assertion 
** cror in the trial in excluding cer-
tMm
 staged photographs depicting a re-
coc
*niction of the position of decedent's 




 ruling was proper. The photo-
c r i?as were only offered to lend support 
** **t defendant's testimonial contentions. 
In these circumstances where an exhibit 
has been arranged simply to portray a 
scene and thereby support testimonial con-
tentions, and when other witnesses dispute 
the accuracy or correctness of the recon-
structed scene, trial court should not ad-
mit the evidence. See State v. Ray, 43 N J . 
19, 202 A.2d 425; State v. Oldham, 92 Ida-
ho 124, 438 P.2d 275. Of course, if the 
parties agree the exhibit correctly portrays 
the scene, the reconstruction may be admit-
ted. 
The judgment is reversed, and the cause 
is remanded for a new trial. 
PRINGLE, C. J., and ERICKSON, J., 
do not participate. 
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CURTIS, INC., a Delaware corporation, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
The DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR the 
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, State 
of Colorado, and the Honorable Robert E. 
McLean, one of the Judges thereof, Re-
spondents. 
No. 25972. 
Supreme Court of Colorado, 
En Banc 
June 18, 1973. 
Original proceeding in nature of pro-
hibition or in the alternative for writ of 
mandamus. The Supreme Court, Kelley, 
J., held that in action involving disclosure 
of trade secrets and confidential informa-
tion concerning plaintiffs record keeping 
and information systems, plaintiff was en-
titled to have the judge hear the evidence 
intially and not through a report from a 
referee, and hence trial court improperly 
appointed a master in such action. 
Rule made absolute, and matter re-
manded with directions. 
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